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Introduction
Falling ill may have a profound impact on peo-
ple’s quality of life (QoL) (Glaser and Strauss, 
1975). The World Health Organization (WHO) 
defines QoL as “individuals’ perception of their 
position in life in the context of the culture and 
value systems in which they live and in relation to 
their goals, expectations, standards and concerns” 
(World Health Organization (WHO), 1997). In the 
medical sciences, research into health-related 
QoL is commonly restricted to patients’ subjective 
evaluation of the adverse effects of diseases and 
treatments. For example, the widely used meas-
ures EuroQoL five dimensions questionnaire 
(EQ-5D) (The EuroQoL Group, 2006) and 
European Organization for Research and 
Treatment of Cancer Quality of Life Questionnaire 
(EORTC QLQ-C30) (Aaronson et al., 1993) 
almost exclusively assess symptoms, side effects, 
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and limitations in functioning. While these meas-
ures are useful and important, they assess only 
part of the QoL people experience. Moreover, 
they do not capture the processes leading to peo-
ple’s evaluation of their QoL.
When people fall seriously ill, for example, 
when they are diagnosed with cancer or a 
heart disease, they are often confronted with 
existential questions (Bolmsjö, 2001; Fife, 
2002; Kruizinga et al., 2017; Van der Spek 
and Verdonck-de Leeuw, 2016). Previous the-
oretical and empirical research suggests that 
the way people make meaning of their disease 
and other life events, in brief “meaning mak-
ing,” influences people’s well-being and QoL 
(Affleck et al., 1987; Albrecht and Devlieger, 
1999; Cohen et al., 1996; Park, 2010; 
Sprangers, 2015; Van der Spek and 
Verdonck-de Leeuw, 2016). For example, the 
way cancer survivors interpret their illness 
was found to correlate with coping strategies 
and QoL (Büssing and Fischer, 2009), and 
meaning-focused coping was found to be 
associated with positive affect in people with 
chronic stress (Folkman and Moskowitz, 
2000) and with positive affect and well-being 
in earthquake victims (Folkman, 2010; 
Folkman and Moskowitz, 2000, 2007; Guo 
et al., 2013).
In psychology and (health) sociology, 
research has been performed on various aspects 
of meaning making and adaptation in the con-
text of stressful life events such as falling ill 
(Antonovsky, 1987; Büssing and Fischer, 2009; 
Folkman and Moskowitz, 2007; Lazarus and 
Folkman, 1984; Park, 2010, 2013; Park and 
Folkman, 1997; Park and George, 2013; Ryan 
and Deci, 2000; Sales et al., 2013; Tedeschi and 
Calhoun, 1996; WHOQoL SRPB Group, 2006). 
Also, important determinants in these processes 
have been considered, including religion, 
worldview, and life goals (Emmons, 1986; 
Emmons et al., 1998; Friedman et al., 2010; 
Hullmann et al., 2015; Janse et al., 2015; 
Jenkins and Pargament, 1995; King et al., 1998; 
Koenig et al., 2001; Levin, 1996; Riley et al., 
1998; Roberts et al., 2007; Sprangers et al., 
2010; Sprangers and Schwartz, 2008).
As shown in an extensive review by Park 
(2010), myriad theoretical perspectives on 
meaning making exist. “Meaning” as defined 
by Baumeister (1991) is a “mental representa-
tion of possible relationships among things, 
events and relationships. Thus, meaning con-
nects things” (p. 15). The meaning making 
model proposed by Park and Folkman (1997) 
and Park (2010, 2013), is based on several 
influential theories on meaning making in the 
context of highly stressful experiences.These 
theories have in common that they view stress-
ful experiences as “disrupting” or “shattering.” 
They lead to discrepancy in people’s orienting 
systems (“global meaning”) and the meaning 
they assign to the situation (“appraised mean-
ing”), causing distress. The process of meaning 
making initiated by this distress is an attempt to 
restore meaning and, if successful, may lead to 
better adjustment to the stressful situation 
(Park, 2010). For the “products” of these pro-
cesses of meaning making, Park uses the term 
“meanings made”. Examples of these outcomes 
are acceptance, the sense of having “made 
sense,” reattributions of the cause of the event, 
restored or changed sense of meaning in life, 
changed global beliefs, and integration of the 
stressful experience into one’s (changed) iden-
tity. Every theoretical perspective emphasizes 
certain aspects of the impact of the event, the 
process of meaning making, and the “meanings 
made,” such as disruptions in life narratives, 
underlying cognitive structures, specific coping 
processes or outcomes such as benefit finding 
and post-traumatic growth. Since 2010, several 
empirical studies have been carried out that can 
be placed within the framework of Park’s model 
(e.g. Davis and Novoa, 2013; Dezutter et al., 
2015, 2017; Park and George, 2013; Rajandram 
et al., 2011).
In this article, we propose a humanities 
approach to meaning making1 relating to QoL. 
Our model combines theories on contingency 
and narrative identity, emphasizing the crisis of 
meaning people may experience when con-
fronted with the “randomness” of life, which 
requires narrative reconstruction. Falling ill is 
an example of a contingent life event: 
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something that befalls people but could also 
have been otherwise. In other words, a contin-
gent event is “something that is neither neces-
sary nor impossible” (Luhmann, 1995; 
Wuchterl, 2011). The word contingent refers to 
the idea that everything, including one’s own 
life, could have been different (Makropoulos, 
1997; Zirfas, 2014). In late modern societies, 
people have become increasingly aware of the 
contingency of the world and their own lives 
(Joas, 2016; Makropoulos, 1997; Scherer-Rath 
et al., 2012). As a result of globalization, secu-
larization, and individualization, traditional 
structures lost influence, leaving individuals 
responsible for their own beliefs and choices in 
life (Bauman, 2013). Because events no longer 
have a self-evident place in people’s personal 
perspective on life, they have to find their own 
interpretations and reactions in accordance 
with their personal needs, desires and expecta-
tions (Scherer-Rath et al., 2012). Meaning 
making, especially of negative events that 
impact people’s lives profoundly, is thus a 
challenge for individuals, requiring constant 
appraisal and accommodation (Keupp, 2010; 
Scherer-Rath, 2014).
Making meaning of life events is often done 
in a narrative way, by telling stories that config-
ure separate events into a meaningful whole. By 
constructing stories, people try to make sense of 
their experiences, providing a sense of overall 
meaning and purpose to their lives (Baumeister, 
1991; Emmons, 1999; McAdams, 1993; 
McAdams and Manczak, 2015; Straub, 2005). 
According to the philosopher Ricoeur (1984), 
people narratively interpret the world and their 
lives in three stages, called “mimesis”: the imi-
tation of human action. The first stage is the 
prefiguration of our daily lives that already con-
tain networks of structures that make storytell-
ing possible, such as symbols and temporal 
structures. Thus, people’s lived experiences can 
be seen as stories that are not yet told. The sec-
ond stage is the imaginative configuration of 
elements such as life events into a life narrative. 
Just as the plot of a story, this “narrative emplot-
ment” brings order and coherence by connect-
ing events, persons, and objects, as meaningful 
parts of a larger whole. Although this configu-
ration endows the connections between the ele-
ments of the story with meaning and even with 
a certain necessity, this does not imply that con-
tingency disappears or is not taken into account. 
The emplotment brings together heterogeneous 
elements into a tensive state of “concordant dis-
cordance”: a configuration of events that are 
still contingent and may still be disrupting the 
story, but with an internal coherence that gives 
them a meaningful place.
The third stage of mimesis, refiguration, is 
the integration of this imaginative perspective 
into people’s lived experience (Ricoeur, 1984). 
This means that people “read” their own life 
story, integrating their life events and experi-
ences in the way they understand themselves. 
Thus, a person’s life narrative can be seen as a 
form of identity that both reflects and shapes 
who the person is (McAdams, 1993; Ricoeur, 
1995). Therefore, dealing with life events that 
disrupt people’s life story is often not merely a 
matter of coping and adaptation, but a process 
of meaning making that may change the iden-
tity of the person (Singer, 2004). Our theoreti-
cal model thus entails the concepts “narrative 
meaning making” and “narrative integration” of 
life events.
Although our approach shows kinship with 
several psychological concepts included in 
Park’s framework, a new perspective is intro-
duced in our comprehensive approach that 
integrates contingency theory and theories of 
narrative identity. As stated by Park (2010), 
little research has been carried out on the 
integration of stressful life events and the 
identity change related to it. In our model, 
meaning making is seen as narrative recon-
struction, leading to a certain extent of narra-
tive integration. While psychological 
approaches mainly focus on psychological 
processes and mechanisms and how they 
influence functioning, we emphasize the 
existential dimension of the same process of 
relating to the life events that befall us 
(Gendlin, 1962; Singer, 2004). For example, 
in our model, re-interpretation of life events 
is always explicitly connected with one’s 
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worldview and ultimate life goals, and with 
the meaning of the event in the context of 
one’s personal life narrative. The substantial 
approach we use, allows for investigating and 
understanding the contents of people’s inter-
pretations, going beyond explaining how 
existential concepts function in the process of 
reducing discrepancies and maintaining or 
restoring well-being. While a process such as 
cognitive reappraisal may very well play a 
role in the process of narrative meaning mak-
ing, the latter cannot be reduced to just 
another coping process. Rather, narrative 
meaning making can be seen as the existen-
tial dimension underlying coping and adjust-
ment. In addition, the narrative perspective 
implies that it is not distress per se that evokes 
existential questions and initiates a process of 
meaning making, but the narrative disruption 
by the life event itself, causing an experience 
of contingency, as we will explain below.
With our model, we aim to combine 
approaches from humanities and medical sci-
ences, to develop a substantive theory on how 
meaning making influences QoL. By develop-
ing a theoretical framework on narrative 
meaning making of life events, combining 
narrative theory and contingency theory, we 
aim to improve our understanding of the way 
life events such as illness influence patients’ 
QoL.
Methodological approach
As a starting point, we used the conceptual 
model for reconstructing the interpretation of 
life stories that was described and empirically 
tested previously (Kruizinga et al., 2013; 
Scherer-Rath, 2013; Scherer-Rath et al., 2012; 
Van Dalen et al., 2012; Van den Brand et al., 
2014, 2016). This model combines contingency 
theory (Wuchterl, 2011) and narrative theory 
(Ricoeur, 1995; Straub, 2005), focusing on the 
role of narrative interpretation of life events in 
the construction of personal identity (Van den 
Brand et al., 2014). Since our aim is to improve 
our understanding of the way meaning making 
of illness experiences influences QoL, we car-
ried out a literature search on meaning making, 
contingency, life goals, narrative identity, 
worldview, well-being and QoL, and refined 
and adapted the model.
Theoretical model
The resulting theoretical model describes the 
dominant relationships between the following 
elements, as illustrated in Figure 1. Falling ill, 
as a life event, conflicts with the person’s world-
view and/or with one or more ultimate life goals 
that are anchored in the worldview. The conflict 
can result in an experience of contingency. In 
the process of narrative meaning making that 
Figure 1. Theoretical model: narrative meaning making of life events. The dominant relationships and 
feedback loops are highlighted.
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follows, the life event is re-interpreted in the 
context of one’s own life narrative. Eventually, 
the event is integrated in the personal life story 
to a greater or lesser extent (narrative integra-
tion), affecting patients’ QoL.
The feedback loops in the model indicate 
that meaning making, resulting in narrative 
integration, may not be a linear but an iterative 
process. In the case of an experience of contin-
gency, meaning making and narrative integra-
tion may not have taken place yet or may be 
unsuccessful, leading to a lower level of QoL. 
Narrative meaning making leading to narrative 
integration is expected to reduce the experience 
of contingency, thus increasing the level of 
QoL. It should be noted that this “reduction” of 
the experience of contingency refers to a reduc-
tion of the crisis of meaning at that moment. It 
does not “erase” the experience of contingency 
from the person’s life narrative, nor the existen-
tial significance of the life event. The life event 
remains a “biographical disruption” in one’s 
life narrative, but is given a meaningful place. 
The meaning attributed to an event can continue 
to change, even after years, and may reduce but 
also increase the experience of contingency, 
affecting the person’s QoL. The elements of the 
theoretical model will be described below.
Life events
In narrative theory, events are defined as occur-
rences that the person interprets as meaningful 
in the context of her or his life story (Ricoeur, 
1995). If a person considers an event as signifi-
cant for his or her life as a whole, we speak of a 
life event (Frijda, 2007). Because we cannot 
fully control the course of most events, they can 
be considered contingent: they can happen, but 
do not necessarily have to happen (Wuchterl, 
2012). This holds for both positive and negative 
events, unexpected as well as expected. Indeed, 
also expected events might not happen or might 
be inevitable while people may want to prevent 
them from happening. However, especially 
unexpected negative life events, such as illness, 
loss of beloved ones, and accidents, often con-
flict with life goals and/or the person’s 
worldview. These kinds of events may confront 
people with the “existential givens” of life, such 
as human mortality, making them realize that 
being alive implies being vulnerable, out of 
control, and unable to understand the world 
(Park, 2013; Vos, 2015). Shattering fundamen-
tal assumptions and disrupting people’s 
expected course of life, negative life events 
may not be integrated as easily in a person’s life 
story as positive life events (Janoff-Bulman, 
2010).
Worldview
Worldview is also referred to as “outlook on 
life” or “philosophy of life.” We define world-
view broadly, as people’s meaning system that 
informs the way they perceive the world, human 
life and death, and their own position and per-
sonal identity. A person’s worldview is always 
culturally embedded and serves as a framework 
of (implicit and explicit) conceptions, beliefs, 
and attitudes by which people interpret reality 
(Kraft, 2008; Schnell and Keenan, 2011). As 
such, worldview is also the framework by 
which people construct their values and goals 
and make meaning of life events in the context 
of their personal life narrative (cf. “Global 
meaning” in Park’s (2013) framework).
A person’s worldview can be religious or 
non-religious, but always contains structures 
referring to a foundational reality—the person’s 
conception of reality—that can be immanent or 
transcendent (Tillich, 1963; Van den Brand 
et al., 2014). This reality is immanent when it 
refers to fellow humans or nature, that is, the 
perceptible and intelligible world. It is trans-
cendent when referring to something greater, 
higher, or deeper than ourselves and our percep-
tible world (Walach, 2011). This transcendent 
reality can be personal (such as “God”) or 
impersonal (such as “a higher power” and 
“something higher”) (Bucher, 2014) and can be 
experienced as something external but also as 
something within the self, often referred to as 
the “more,” as in “what we see, is not all there 
is” (Elkins et al., 1988). The transcendent 
dimension, also referred to as “the spiritual 
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dimension,” offers people the opportunity to 
place and interpret life events in a framework 
that transcends our human world (De Pater 
et al., 2008; Scherer-Rath et al., 2012).
When people believe that there is nothing 
beyond our human, perceivable world, we 
speak of “absolute immanence.” In contrast, 
when people believe that everything in our 
world and beyond is shaped and determined by 
a higher power, we speak of “absolute tran-
scendence” (Van Straten et al., 2013). In late 
modern societies, people’s foundational reality 
is usually characterized by a combination of 
immanence and transcendence. It can be 
“immanent transcendent,” meaning that a trans-
cendent reality influences or permeates the per-
ceivable world, but does not determine 
everything. The foundational reality can also be 
“transcendent immanent.” The immanent world 
is the starting point, from which people can 
transcend themselves and their actions to come 
into contact with that which transcends the per-
ceivable world (Van der Ven, 1998; Van Straten 
et al., 2013).
Ultimate life goals
People’s worldview beliefs, encompassing—
often implicit—visions on “the good,” give rise 
to their personal goals (Emmons, 1999). Their 
worldview thus anchors and justifies their per-
sonal goals that determine the meaning attrib-
uted to a life event (Baumeister, 1991; Frijda, 
2007). As detailed by Emmons, people usually 
have many personal goals, which are not all 
equally important: they are hierarchically 
ranked (Baumeister and Vohs, 2003; Emmons, 
1999). They can be distinguished in “ultimate 
life goals” and “instrumental life goals.” 
Ultimate life goals are the goals, or values, that 
give ultimate meaning to our lives—“ultimate” 
in the sense that this value cannot be replaced 
by something else. They are universal in the 
sense that they are shared by many people, and 
they are formulated in an abstract way. Because 
they are so central in people’s lives, an event 
that conflicts with these ultimate life goals may 
result in an experience of contingency.
In contrast, instrumental goals are more 
direct and concrete, often referring to actions. 
They are instrumental in the sense that they are 
directed toward fulfilling ultimate life goals 
that give them their meaning and direction 
(Emmons, 1992, 1999; Frijda, 2007; Kruizinga 
et al., 2013; Van den Brand, 2016; Van den 
Brand et al., 2014). An example of an ultimate 
life goal is “taking care of my child,” anchoring 
the instrumental life goal “helping my daughter 
with her homework.”
Experience of contingency
An experience of contingency is caused by a 
life event that conflicts with the person’s world-
view and/or ultimate life goals and raises exis-
tential questions (Bury, 1982; Holzinger, 2015; 
Kruizinga et al., 2013; Scherer-Rath, 2013; 
Scherer-Rath et al., 2012; Van Dalen et al., 
2012; Wuchterl, 2012). An experience of con-
tingency can be seen as a biographical disrup-
tion: a “breach of trust” that urges the person to 
reinterpret one’s own life story, including the 
life event as a part of it (Giddens, 1990; Scherer-
Rath, 2014). In religious studies, experience of 
contingency is also called “interpretation crisis” 
or “crisis of meaning” (Dalferth and Stoellger, 
2000; Geertz and Banton, 1966; Scherer-Rath, 
2013, 2014), emphasizing the inability to under-
stand and grasp the life event (Wuchterl, 2012). 
This inability to make sense and meaning of the 
life event, conflicts with the fundamental 
human need for understanding, coherence, and 
meaning (Baumeister, 1991; Baumeister et al., 
2013; Frankl and Lasch, 1962; Heine et al., 
2006; Schnell, 2009; Williams, 1984).
Unexpected events, such as a train delay, 
getting the flu or falling in love, do not always 
result in an “experience of contingency.” It is 
the conflict with people’s worldview and/or the 
ultimate goals they strive for, which may “rup-
ture” their life story and evoke existential ques-
tions. This can also happen as a result of a 
positive life event, such as winning the lottery. 
Whereas such events may seem desirable, they 
can indeed conflict with one’s ultimate life 
goals and identity and can raise existential 
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questions, challenging people’s outlook on life. 
Whether an event results in an experience of 
contingency or not will depend on a variety of 
factors, such as personality, experiences in the 
past, the context of the life story, and the 
moment of occurrence in the person’s life. For 
example, life events such as ending a relation-
ship or losing one’s parents have a different 
meaning for the young, than for older people.
Falling seriously ill may lead to an experi-
ence of contingency, since illness often con-
flicts with life goals and confronts people with 
the randomness of life, the vulnerability of what 
they value, and their limits of control (Vos, 
2015). Such an event can also conflict with peo-
ple’s worldview, thereby shattering people’s 
most fundamental assumptions about them-
selves, the world and the relationship between 
the two (Janoff-Bulman, 2010). Falling seri-
ously ill may, for example, conflict with one’s 
experience of control or with the belief in a 
benevolent, higher power.
Empirical research on the way people talk 
about experiences of contingency resulting 
from falling ill shows that these “interpretation 
crises” are often presented in two ways. First, in 
the use of metaphors, expressing the impact of 
the event on the person’s life. For example, can-
cer patients talk about their diagnosis as a 
“shock” or “blow,” or state that the event made 
“their world come crashing down” (Kruizinga 
et al., 2017; Van Dalen et al., 2012). These 
expressions are metaphors, having a symbolic 
rather than a literal, descriptive meaning. 
Metaphors may provide a rational bridge 
between the known and the unknown, in this 
case between the situation before and after the 
event (Boylstein et al., 2007; Petrie and Oshlag, 
1993). The second way is asking questions, try-
ing to understand the event in the context of the 
person’s life story. Negative events such as a 
heart attack and cancer diagnosis may evoke 
questions about the cause of the event: who or 
what caused it, and would it not have happened 
if I had acted in other ways? Other possible 
questions are more existential, such as: why did 
it happen to me? What does this mean for my 
life, now and in the future?
Narrative meaning making
Narrative meaning making is the process that is 
hypothesized to follow the experience of con-
tingency and serves to reinterpret the life event 
in the context of one’s own life narrative, thus 
giving it a new meaning. In our theoretical 
model, we highlight three aspects of narrative 
meaning making.
First, evaluation is the attribution of a posi-
tive or negative meaning to the event, that is, 
whether the person sees the event as something 
positive or negative. This evaluation depends 
highly on the ultimate life goals that are 
obstructed or enhanced by the event (Emmons, 
1992, 1999; Kruizinga et al., 2013). Over time, 
while re-interpreting the event, the evaluation 
can change. Something perceived as negative at 
the moment of occurrence could eventually be 
interpreted as having a positive meaning for life 
as a whole. Even with a diagnosis of incurable 
cancer, people were found to find a positive 
meaning (Affleck et al., 1987; Emmons, 1999; 
Helgeson et al., 2006; Tedeschi and Calhoun, 
1996).
Second, agency refers to the perceived role 
of the person as active or passive. An active role 
implies that the person interprets the event as 
something that he or she caused or accom-
plished; a passive role implies that the event is 
seen as something that befell him or her 
(Kruizinga et al., 2013; Scherer-Rath et al., 
2012). Asking questions about the cause of the 
event, people may arrive at conclusions such as 
“it was my own fault” and “it befell me.” 
However, people can also conclude that the 
exact cause cannot be known, for example in 
case of a disease of which the risk is increased 
by genetic predisposition as well as by an 
unhealthy lifestyle.
Third, scope refers to the scale or span of the 
meaning that the event has for the person. An 
existential scope means that the person recog-
nizes the significance of the event for his or her 
life as a whole. The scope is spiritual if the 
interpretation of the life event refers to a trans-
cendent dimension (for our definition of “trans-
cendent,” see the description of “Worldview”). 
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This is expected to be the case for people with a 
worldview referring to an absolute transcend-
ent, immanent transcendent, or transcendent 
immanent foundational reality. In contrast, the 
scope can also be situational, i.e. having only 
meaning for a particular situation, but not for 
the person’s life as a whole. Since in such cases 
a conflict with ultimate life goals or worldview 
is not likely, we do not expect events with a 
situational meaning to result in an experience of 
contingency (Scherer-Rath et al., 2012).
In expressions about the meaning of a life 
event, evaluation, agency, and scope are often 
encountered in combination, for example as the 
interpretation of an event as “bad luck.” The 
word “bad” refers to a negative evaluation. As 
for agency, the word “luck” implies that the per-
son’s perceived role is passive. If the person 
interprets the event only as “bad luck” in a spe-
cific situation and not for life as a whole, the 
scope is situational.
Narrative integration
Narrative integration results from the process 
of narrative meaning making and refers to the 
extent to which the life event is integrated in the 
life narrative, given a new meaning and becom-
ing a part of someone’s identity (Scherer-Rath, 
2014; Williams, 1984). Narrative integration 
can be seen as the human capacity to acknowl-
edge contingency and integrate experiences 
into a meaningful whole, including life events 
that result in an experience of contingency 
(Ricoeur, 1986). Such life events are thus nar-
ratively “worked” to make them plausible but 
without disregarding their contingency (Straub, 
2005, 2016). The event is still interpreted as a 
disruption of the life story, but is given a mean-
ingful place (Scherer-Rath, 2014).
Some people may be more able than others 
to integrate life events causing an experience of 
contingency in their life story, also depending 
on the type of event and the specific situation 
and life phase. Based on a previous study 
among cancer patients (Kruizinga et al., 2017), 
we distinguish four modes of increasing narra-
tive integration.
First, in the mode of denying, the interpreta-
tion process is aborted rather than engaged in. 
There is no real confrontation with one’s own 
vulnerability or the limits of one’s own abilities 
to understand why the event has happened, and 
no attempts are made to integrate the event into 
the person’s life story. We distinguish two types 
of denying. The first is ignoring the existential 
relevance of the event, leaving no questions 
about (the cause of) the event or the conse-
quences for one’s life. The second type is deny-
ing the contingency of the event, usually 
unconsciously, giving a definitive explanation 
for the event by stating that it had to happen, 
thus “removing” contingency. Such an explana-
tion can result from a theocentric worldview—
from which the cause of the event is interpreted 
as the absolute influence of a higher being—or 
from an interpretation of the event as a direct 
result from natural laws or from “absolute 
chance” (Wuchterl, 2011). In all forms of deny-
ing the contingency of the event, the explana-
tion is not the outcome of a search for an 
interpretation of the cause, but a way to “fix” 
contingency and end the interpretation process 
(Wuchterl, 2011).
In both types of denying, there is no need to 
search for a meaningful place for the event in 
one’s life story, and the event is described as in 
no way part of the person’s life. In this mode, 
people may talk about the life event in terms of 
“necessity” or “moving on,” such as “This was 
meant to be, all part of His plan for me” and “I 
just want to go on, so that’s wat I’m doing.”
Second, in the mode of acknowledging, the 
contingency of the event is taken seriously: the 
non-necessity and non-impossibility of the 
event are recognized and the event is seen as a 
disruption of the person’s life story. No defini-
tive explanation is given for the event, but a 
process of interpretation is put in motion, 
searching for the cause of the event and what it 
means for the person’s life. In this mode, people 
often ask existential questions, which can be 
seen as first attempts to integrate the event in 
the life story. People may also talk about the 
event in terms of necessity (“ought” or “have 
to”) and refer to the future, for example “I will 
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have to accept it” or “I have to let go of so many 
things.” These expressions indicate a willing-
ness to acknowledge the significance for one’s 
life and engage in the process of narrative inte-
gration, without, however, accepting the event.
Third, in the mode of accepting, both the 
contingency of the life event and the new reality 
that comes with the consequences of the life 
event are acknowledged. The person actively 
searches for ways to integrate the event in the 
personal life narrative, re-interpreting the event. 
The initial meaning of the event often changes, 
and sometimes, the person sees new possibili-
ties as a result of the event. Nevertheless, in this 
mode, the narrative reconstruction is still a 
struggle. The event is accepted but not fully 
integrated in the life story, and the new possi-
bilities are not fully embraced. In this mode, 
people may talk about the event using verbs that 
indicate a process of re-interpretation, such as 
“At the moment, I can accept it more than in the 
beginning” or “It is a part of my life now.”
Finally, in the mode of receiving, the contin-
gency of the life event and the new reality are 
acknowledged and the integration of the event 
in the life story is completed. In terms of the 
Ricoeurs (1984) stages of mimesis, the third 
stage (refiguration) allows for new perspectives 
on one’s life narrative and consequently changes 
in one’s self-understanding. A process of trans-
formation and reshaping has taken place, as a 
result of embracing the positive “new possibili-
ties” that emerge from the life event. These new 
possibilities can be concrete and caused directly 
by the life event, such as queue jumping and 
access to front rows in theaters due to a disabil-
ity. They can also be new insights that the life 
event has brought, considering what people find 
important in life, or their perspective on human 
life as a whole. It does not necessarily mean that 
the event is re-interpreted as something posi-
tive, and grief or loss is not mitigated or played 
down, but new possibilities are part of the re-
interpretation. People can arrive at the mode of 
receiving by relating to the immanent world, 
but also by relating the event or the self-trans-
formation to a transcendent dimension. In both 
cases, the person is receptive for that which 
cannot be rationally understood and for the new 
possibilities that emerge from the life event 
(Straub, 2016). In this mode, people often refer 
to values   that have become more central in 
their life. Past participles are used to express a 
completed process and a certain passivity in the 
narrative reconstruction, for example, “I have 
learned a lot from it” or “It has made me realize 
what I find important in life.”
After some time, life events can be given a 
definite meaning. However, its meaning—and, 
therefore, the degree of integration in the life 
story—remains subject to change. Moreover, 
new experiences in life may urge for a reinter-
pretation of the event. It should also be noted 
that narrative meaning making and integration 
are part of life and of growing older. We con-
stantly reinterpret events in the context of our 
life story and adapt our identity to accommo-
date changes to a lesser or greater extent, con-
sciously or unconsciously.
Hypotheses
Clearly, the process of narrative meaning mak-
ing of life events is complex, multilayered, and 
dynamic. The proposed model is meant as a 
framework from which testable hypotheses can 
be derived. The dominant relationships and 
feedback loops as denoted in Figure 1; all repre-
sent hypotheses that are yet to be tested.
The first hypothesis is that an experience of 
contingency implies a conflict between a life 
event and ultimate life goals or worldview. A 
related hypothesis is that an experience of con-
tingency is more likely to occur or more pro-
found when a life event does not only conflict 
with people’s ultimate life goals, but also 
directly with their worldview, challenging their 
beliefs and outlook on life.
The second hypothesis is that an experience 
of contingency impacts QoL adversely. As 
argued before, an experience of contingency 
indicates an inability to make sense and mean-
ing of the life event, conflicting with the funda-
mental human need for understanding, 
coherence and meaning. Because narrative 
meaning making takes time, it is expected that 
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shortly after an event leading to an experience 
of contingency, people may experience lower 
levels of QoL.
Third, we expect that after an experience of 
contingency, a process of meaning making 
starts, in which the person re-interprets the life 
event in the context of his or her life narrative. 
If the event is attributed a meaningful interpre-
tation in the context of one’s life story, the expe-
rience of contingency is expected to be reduced 
(upper feedback loop) and QoL to be increased, 
compared to the time shortly after the event. 
This meaningful interpretation does not neces-
sarily mean that the event is attributed a posi-
tive meaning. It means that in contrast to the 
“crisis of meaning” during the experience of 
contingency, the person has come to a certain 
degree of understanding the meaning of the 
event for his or her life as a whole. As an itera-
tive process, narrative meaning making is 
expected to continue, as long as the experience 
of contingency (the crisis of meaning) is not 
reduced significantly.
Fourth, we expect narrative meaning making 
to lead to narrative integration: the process of 
meaning making in the context of the person’s 
life as a whole may result in the integration of 
the life event in the life story. Hypotheses can 
also be derived with respect to the different 
aspects of meaning making and integration. For 
example, a more disputable hypothesis refers to 
the relationship between scope and receiving. 
When the scope of the meaning attributed to an 
event is spiritual, the person refers to a trans-
cendent dimension. This indicates an openness 
to relate to that which transcends our perceiva-
ble, intelligible world. As such, individuals 
attributing a spiritual meaning to a life event 
may arrive at the “receiving” mode of narrative 
integration more often than people attributing a 
situational or existential meaning to the event 
(Kruizinga et al., 2017; Scherer-Rath et al., 
2012).
Fifth, a more complete narrative integration 
of the life event (i.e. receiving) as a result of 
meaning making is expected to reduce the expe-
rience of contingency (lower feedback loop) 
and enhance QoL. Theoretical and empirical 
research in psychology and religious studies 
suggests that well-being is associated with the 
ability to integrate positive as well as negative 
experiences into one’s life story and perception 
of the self (Bauer et al., 2008; Bohlmeijer et al., 
2008; McAdams, 1993; Pot et al., 2010; 
Scherer-Rath, 2013; Van den Brand et al., 2014; 
Van Straten et al., 2013; Weiss et al., 2016; 
Westerhof et al., 2010a, 2010b). Because this 
association suggests that a more complete inte-
gration of negative experiences results in higher 
levels of well-being, we expect that more narra-
tive integration results in higher levels of QoL 
(Keupp et al., 1999).
Thus, our expectation is that the combina-
tion of meaning making and integration will 
lead to a larger reduction of the experience of 
contingency and consequent enhancement of 
QoL than meaning making alone. The extent to 
which both narrative meaning making and inte-
gration are needed for experiencing good levels 
of QoL remains to be investigated. Because pre-
vious studies suggest that autobiographical rea-
soning might not always increase well-being 
(McLean and Mansfield, 2011), and that denial 
may be beneficial to social and emotional out-
comes in cancer patients (Vos et al., 2011), it 
may be the case that after specific traumatic life 
events, denying would—at least in the short 
term—lead to higher levels of QoL than actively 
engaging in the process of narrative meaning 
making and integration.
The concept of narrative integration also 
holds other questions. For example, we do not 
know whether the four modes of increasing nar-
rative integration are phases that people go 
through—each mode presupposing the former 
mode—or that modes can be skipped. Whereas 
we expect linear processes to be rare, we do not 
know under what conditions people may jump 
back and forth to achieve narrative integration. 
Further research is needed to investigate these 
processes.
It is likely that many other relationships exist 
that are not shown in the (simplified) figure. For 
example, it might be interesting to investigate the 
direct influence of worldview on narrative mean-
ing and the influence of worldview and ultimate 
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life goals on QoL. Moreover, we expect more 
feedback loops to exist than are shown in the 
model. For example, the process of narrative 
meaning making and narrative integration could 
change a person’s worldview and (the impor-
tance of) ultimate life goals (Gutierrez and Park, 
2015). These changes, in turn, may reduce or 
remove the conflict between the life event and 
the person’s worldview and/or ultimate life 
goals, but may also lead to altered ideas about 
what QoL is. Furthermore, we expect time to be 
of importance: people often have a different per-
spective on life events shortly after the event, 
than months or even years later.
Finally, narrative integration could also 
influence the way a person makes meaning of 
life events in the future, because the ability to 
integrate life events in one’s life story could be 
a learning process. Some people who have 
experienced negative life events that confronted 
them with the contingency of life may have suc-
cessfully integrated these events in their life 
story and realize and accept that contingency is 
a part of life. With new life events emerging, the 
experience of contingency may be less severe 
and a meaningful interpretation of the event 
may be found more easily.
Toward an operationalization 
of the theoretical model: the 
RE-LIFE Questionnaire
To allow for empirical testing of our theoretical 
model, we developed a self-report question-
naire: The “Reconstruction of Life Events” 
Questionnaire (RE-LIFE), see Appendix 1 and 
Online Appendix. The RE-LIFE Questionnaire 
is a first operationalization of the concepts of 
the model, designed to assess narrative meaning 
making of all life events, including falling ill. In 
the context of our longitudinal study on QoL, it 
was adapted for cardiac patients with multiple 
morbidities. The results of this study, providing 
information about this questionnaire’s validity, 
will be published separately.
The structure and items of the RE-LIFE 
Questionnaire were developed using an existing 
qualitative instrument, based on the “Analytical 
model for reconstructing interpretation of life 
stories” mentioned before (Kruizinga et al., 
2013; Scherer-Rath, 2013, 2014, 2016; Scherer-
Rath et al., 2012; Van Dalen et al., 2012; Van 
den Brand et al., 2014). This instrument con-
sists of a topic list for semi-structured inter-
views about experiences of contingency caused 
by life events. The items then were further 
developed using transcriptions of in-depth 
interviews with advanced cancer patients that 
were held using the qualitative instrument men-
tioned above (Van Dalen et al., 2012). The “nar-
rative integration” scale was developed in a 
qualitative study described previously 
(Kruizinga et al., 2017). The questionnaire was 
then refined and adapted in pilot tests with 8 
healthy volunteers and 12 cardiac patients, and 
using peer feedback from researchers and prac-
titioners in the fields of medical psychology, 
religious studies, medical ethics, oncology, and 
cardiology.
In order to enable respondents to reflect on 
their most important life events in the context of 
their life as a whole, the questionnaire starts 
with the request to draw a lifeline, with positive 
and negative life events as ups and downs 
(Kruizinga et al., 2013; Van den Brand et al., 
2014). Questions are then asked about the most 
unexpected negative life event (identified by 
the respondent) and the acquisition of the dis-
ease as the second life event. The questionnaire 
enquires about worldview, ultimate life goals, 
experience of contingency, narrative meaning 
making, narrative integration, and QoL. The 
questionnaire is currently being tested in a 
large-scale, longitudinal study among cardiac 
patients undergoing coronary angioplasty or 
bypass surgery.
Conclusion
Our theoretical model elucidates how people 
make meaning of illness in a narrative way. 
Falling seriously ill may be experienced as a 
life event that conflicts with the person’s ulti-
mate life goals and/or worldview, resulting in 
experience of contingency and lower levels of 
QoL. The way people make meaning of such 
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life events may lead to some degree of “narra-
tive integration,” which in turn is expected to 
reduce the experience of contingency (the “cri-
sis of meaning”), increasing the experienced 
QoL.
As stated before, our theoretical model can 
be placed within the meaning-making frame-
work as proposed by Park, and the concepts 
show parallels with well-known psychological 
concepts such as adaptation, acceptance, and 
coping. For example, the concept of discrep-
ancy in Park’s model resembles the conflict 
between the life event and worldview and/or 
ultimate life goals, and the coping process 
“cognitive re-appraisal” bears a resemblance to 
the concept “narrative meaning making” as the 
re-interpretation of the life event in the context 
of one’s life story. Furthermore, the concept of 
narrative integration could be related to “mean-
ings made” such as acceptance, post-traumatic 
growth, changed identity, and changed global 
goals (Park, 2010).
However, the integration of contingency 
theory and theories of narrative identity in our 
model allow for a substantive account of mean-
ing making. The model facilitates the investiga-
tion of the meaning that life events have for 
people in the context of their personal life nar-
rative, and the content of ultimate life goals and 
worldviews that play a role in the construction 
of meaning. Characteristic of our model is the 
concept of narrative integration after an experi-
ence of contingency caused by a life event, in 
which life events are given a meaningful place 
without disregarding their contingent and dis-
ruptive nature, and may lead to changes in peo-
ple’s narrative identity.
Many aspects of the theoretical model need 
to be further explored. The resulting hypotheses 
need to be tested in large-scale, longitudinal 
research incorporating narrative meaning mak-
ing and a broad conceptualization of QoL. The 
proposed theoretical model and the RE-LIFE 
Questionnaire may be used for further research 
on the relationship between meaning making, 
narrative integration, and QoL, to enhance our 
understanding of patients’ QoL.
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Note
1. In contrast to several theories and following 
Baumeister (1991), we use the concept “mean-
ing” in a neutral way, not as “meaningfulness” 
or “meanings made,” but as the meaning a per-
son attributes to life events, which may be either 
positive, negative, or neutral.
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Appendix 1
Table 1. Concepts and items in the RE-LIFE Questionnaire.
Concepts Items
Life event 2.1
Ultimate life goals 2.5; 3.4; 4.1
Worldview 5.1
Experience of contingency 2.2; 3.1
Meaning making
 Evaluation 2.3a–b; 3.2a–b
 Agency 2.3c–e; 3.2c–e
 Scope 2.3f–j; 3.2f–j
Narrative integration
 Denying 2.4b,e,i; 3.3b,e,i
 Acknowledging 2.4a,g,k; 3.3a,g,k
 Accepting 2.4c,f,l; 3.3c,f,l
 Receiving 2.4d,h,j; 3.3d,h,j
Quality of life 5.2
